Glossary

The words, without the fog.

Terms that come up in our writing and in buying conversations, defined as plainly as we can. Where a term touches what we build, there is one link to the place we show it.

Air-gapped network

A network deliberately kept off the internet and off other networks. Updates and evidence cross the gap as files a person carries, so anything that has to call home does not work there.

SeeAir-gapped estates

Alert fatigue

What happens when a tool reports more than anyone can read, so people stop reading it. The cost is not the noise itself; it is the one real finding that scrolls past with it.

SeeOne Patch Tuesday, one alert per server

Audit trail

A record of who did what and when. It is worth something only if a later change to the record can be detected, which is why entries are chained or signed rather than simply stored.

SeeEvidence an auditor verifies offline

Baseline

The recorded state of a system at a chosen moment, kept so that later states can be compared against it. Taking one after a planned change is what keeps the next comparison meaningful.

SeeBaselines and compare

Coordinated vulnerability disclosure

Reporting a flaw to whoever can fix it, agreeing a period in which it gets fixed, and publishing afterwards. A security.txt file at a known address is how a reporter finds where to send it.

SeeVulnerability disclosure

CVE

A public identifier for one specific vulnerability, in the form CVE-2026-1234. It exists so that two parties can be certain they are discussing the same flaw.

SeeAdvisories

Event tree

The chain behind a change: the user who signed in, the processes in between with their command lines, and the change at the end. It answers who and how, not only what.

SeeOne alert, the whole story

File integrity monitoring

Watching files for change and reporting what changed. On its own it reports change; the harder questions are whether the file is the original and whether the change was expected.

SeeThe first question: is it the original?

Fileless attack

An attack that runs code without leaving an executable file on disk, for example straight from memory. A check that only reads files on disk does not see it.

SeeFileless attacks, caught in memory

Hash

A short fingerprint computed from the content of a file. Two files with the same hash hold the same content, so a hash is a cheap way to ask whether something is exactly what it was.

SeeHow a change is weighed

Inventory

The list of what is installed where: packages, versions and files across every machine. Which servers run this version is an inventory question before it is a security question.

SeeFind exactly what runs where

Legitimacy

Whether a file is the original, published by whoever is meant to have published it. This is a different question from whether the file changed: something that never changes can still not be the original.

SeeThe first question: is it the original?

Living off the land

Using what is already installed and already trusted on a machine, such as a shell or an administration utility, so that the activity reads as ordinary work.

SeeOne alert, the whole story

Penetration test

A scoped, time-boxed attempt to break into a defined target, written up with the steps taken and what they produced. The scope and the report are what separate it from an open-ended exercise.

SeePenetration testing

Red team

An exercise run against an objective rather than a list of targets, and measured by what the defenders detect and how they respond. It answers how far someone gets before anyone notices.

SeeRed team engagements

Reverse engineering

Working out what a binary does without its source: reading the code, watching the behaviour, naming the parts. It is how a sample becomes an explanation someone else can act on.

SeeReverse engineering

Rootkit

Software that hides its own presence, for example by intercepting the calls that would list processes or files. It hides from the same system you would use to ask the question.

SeeInside Symbiote

Software supply chain

Everything a piece of software passes through before it runs: the source, the build, the package, the mirror it is fetched from. A compromise anywhere along that path arrives looking like a normal install.

SeeThe first question: is it the original?

Zero trust

An approach that stops treating a position on the network as proof of trust and asks for evidence at each step instead. Applied to files, the question becomes whether this binary is the original, not whether it came from inside.

SeeThe first question: is it the original?

See these terms in the product.

A 30-minute walkthrough on a fleet like yours shows where each one turns up: in an alert, a report and an audit bundle.

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