Which change was not planned?
A servicing run touches thousands of files on every server. A tool that reports each one buries the single change nobody planned.
PCI DSS v4.0 and banking regulation ask for continuous change detection on critical files, and for evidence that a change was authorised. On a fleet that patches every week, that is an operations problem before it is a compliance one.
A servicing run touches thousands of files on every server. A tool that reports each one buries the single change nobody planned.
An assessor rarely asks whether a file changed. They ask who changed it, under whose approval, and where that is written down.
When an advisory lands on a Friday evening, the first question is which machines carry that package, and which exact version.
The first question is whether the binary is the original, not whether it moved. Binaries, libraries and packages are weighed against the original, including what the operating system shipped.
A Windows servicing transaction and its publisher are recognised, and the whole run folds into one alert per server. A suspicious or malicious verdict is never lowered.
A changed file arrives with the user who signed in, still known after sudo, every process in between with its command line, and the change at the end.
Search a package across the fleet and narrow to one exact version, or search a file by name, path or hash. Vulnerabilities and end-of-life dates sit on the same inventory.
Change windows, approval policies and four-eyes review are part of the product, and the ticket reference stays on the record instead of in somebody's mailbox.
Where your regulator keeps in-scope systems and their data in your own country or on your own premises, the path is the self-hosted build: the same product on your infrastructure, activated from a signed licence file.
A monthly Windows update rewrites thousands of system files on every server. Each one is weighed before anyone is paged, and the run lands as one alert per server with its evidence attached, so the change nobody planned is the one that stands out.
MEDIUM · Windows servicing: system files changed by Microsoft-signed contentSee the proof: Change is a question, not an alert.Integrity telemetry fills in control statuses while the fleet runs. The mapping is ours; the assessment is your assessor's.
It is not a certification. No product is PCI DSS certified; it produces the evidence your assessor asks for.
It does not discover cardholder data or scope a card data environment, and it does not inspect what files contain.
It detects, explains and evidences. Blocking, isolating a host or killing a process is not something it does.
A 30-minute walkthrough on servers like yours: change detection on critical files, the approval behind each change and the bundle your assessor receives.
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